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 In a video documentary produced by Lee Sedwick in 2002, biographer 
Robin Marantz Henig (The Monk in the Garden, 2001) says of Mendel that 
he  was  a  “situational”  monk,  i.e.  someone  who  did  not  join  the  priesthood  
out of a calling but out of the fact that he had nowhere to get an education 
from, such that in the end his calling was that of knowledge. This standard 
over-beaten path of secular rendition of the triumph of science over obscur-
antism gives the spirit in which this book is written. Surely, we are told, it is 
impossible that one would, in his right mind, ask to be ordained Catholic 
priest and really mean it out of belief in God, rather the new clerics will tell 
us what is acceptable and what is not from the viewpoint of increasing the 
knowledge  of  humankind.  To  paraphrase  Francis  Bacon,  we’d  be  like  chil-
dren back in the garden of Eden, in fact the garden of salvation through 
knowledge,  and  as  the  subtitle  indicates,  Coyne’s  (hereafter  C.)  book  is  an  
attempt to argue for the incompatibility of science and religion. It has five 
chapters. The first one posits the problem. The second, which is the longest 
(70  pages)  describes  what’s   incompatible  and  speaks   in  particular  of   con-
flict of method, of outcome, and of philosophy. The third looks at attempts 
to  engage  science  and  to  “integrate”  it  inside  a  Christian  worldview,  to  use  
one  of   Ian  Barbour’s   famous  categories.  The  fourth   is  about   faith  striking  
back, and it deals with the recent renewal of natural theology and the at-
tempts of some to restrict scientific knowledge only to a certain corner of 
humankind’s  overall  experience  of  the  world.  In  the  fifth  chapter,  C.  claims  
that one can show cases of detriment incurred by the estate of man, to speak 
Hobbes’  language,  if  religion  were  to march on triumphantly and supplant 
science.  
 Chapter 2 sets the tone of the whole endeavour, if one is to focus on the 
truth-claims   made   in   this   book.   In   attempts   to   define   “fact”   and   what   is  
meant by it, C. claims that problems start to arise when one considers the 
empirical content of revelation. He asserts that it is never parsimonious to 
invoke God and explains further that, whereas we can define a religion, it is 
more fruitful for the present purposes to engage monotheistic traditions, in-
ducing a further distinction, saying he will consider theistic religions where 
God is said to intervene in the world (42). This is interesting, and we will 
have to come back to it, but it seems to imply that were God made respon-
sible for the orderliness and the heuristic character of a world that works 
well, that is eupraxic, that contains information, then such a God could be 
denied. But the ways in which one could deny that God would be equiva-




lent to the ways in which one could deny being conscious, even having a 
personal name, for short an identity. C. does not realize how, if this were 
the case, it is all experience of the qualitative that we would have to rule 
out; this is why the great doctors of the history of Christian theology have 
reasoned by saying: whatever men have designated as a transcendent hori-
zon to what we can know and determine, that we also call God. How could 
we otherwise account for our being able to operate in all these disconnected 
realms through the unique perspective one gets from sharing a worldview 
that is unified? C. makes the case that existence claims about gods are em-
pirical and require some kind of evidence (47). He approves of an article by 
A. Bernstein (from The Objective Standard, a journal devoted to applying 
the egotistic philosophy of Ayn Rand!) saying that theology, in using some 
of the best intellects that have happened in history, has wasted their admi-
rable capacities on nothing (58). He also argues that it is false to say that 
Augustine, and Aquinas later, favoured a non-literal reading of Scripture. C. 
entirely misses the point that Aquinas, fighting for a spiritual sense that 
would be in the literal sense, argued against free-floating allegorical inter-
pretations,   and   that,   furthermore,   he   asked   in   the   end   “what   is   real?”  As  
such, he expressed a conviction that a theory of reality is constituted fun-
damentally by meaning, by a huge hierarchy of hieroglyphic signs in the 
cosmos, and that these are too rich and multifarious to be all included in our 
capacity for metaphorization, hence   their   “hiding”   forever  under   the   stub-
bornness of the letter. 
C. repeats a claim already made by Richard Dawkins that, contrary to 
the   mindset   instilled   by   Gould’s   “non-overlapping   magisteria”   proposal  
(NOMA), religion also deals with facts about the universe, and that con-
versely  the  “big  questions”  can  be  perfectly  handled  by  secular  philosophy  
without having recourse to the concept of God (65). When C. says that re-
ligion will make propositions that can be controlled empirically, he does not 
in fact further this in any construal that is epistemologically potent, since he 
is content with saying that religion learns what it learns from revelations, 
and that it produces or secretes beliefs that are resistant to falsification (66). 
His next step is to say that truth in religion becomes inevitably dependent 
on confirmation bias. In the face of many studies in the sociology of science 
that  have  pointed  out  that  there  is  a  “fiducial”  or  “tacit  knowledge”  element  
underlying the commitment to scientific hypotheses, C. clings to the state-
ment that scientists would rather abjure all authority because they have con-
fidence in some authorities only to the extent that those have earned their 
trust by making correct predictions, and that this confidence is not in any 
way akin to religious faith. C. takes an evidentialist approach and applies it 
to the problem of the resurrection, saying that it would be irrational for 
someone to say that, were the resurrection proven impossible, one would 
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continue to believe in it (73-4). He completes the picture by saying that he 
has never himself seen a Christian who would abandon his belief in the res-
urrection if science proved it wrong. These remarks are meant to support 
the more foundational statement that an “accommodationist” strategy would 
inevitably leave one in the presence of a double standard. This is seen when 
theologians transform scientific necessities – points at which findings of 
science have contradicted the empirical claims made by Scripture – into re-
ligious  virtues.  For  example,  the  “design”  of  animals  and  plants  was  a  merit  
of the deity, a proof of the benevolence of God; when it was dismissed by 
Darwin, the refutation of the idea of a God acting everywhere fell back on 
God but to increase his greatness, his creative genius, since he was then re-
garded as all the wiser for not having to intervene everywhere. Here, the 
consideration   of   Frederick   Temple’s   lectures   of   1884   (The Relations be-
tween Religion and Science)  would  show  that  C.’s  problem  was  addressed  
long ago, and that the solution given by Temple approached that advocated 
by C. on pp. 145-6, speaking of a God who created pre-determined encoun-
ters   that   in   the  end  vindicate  Paley’s  concept  of  design,   rendering   it  more  
probable to the extent that its instances are less. 
 C. laments that religions are incompatible with one another. This is a 
problem throughout the book. Even though there is an attempt in chapter 1 
at effecting some clarification, it remains the case that what is dismissed is 
any possibility of a valid religious language that would be experience-
based, an argument that was already made by neo-positivism long ago 
(85f.). If it suits him, C. will point the finger at monotheistic traditions, but 
the problem remains that “religion” is a term that has taken on such a wide 
logical extension that is difficult in the end to know what one is talking 
about. Marxism and psychoanalysis have both been called “religions” by 
their detractors. C. tries to win on the empirical ground by saying that he 
challenges anyone to give him a single fact about reality that came from 
Scripture alone and later would have been confirmed by science or by em-
pirical   observation.   After   quoting   the   famous   book   review   of   C.   Sagan’s  
The Demon-Haunted World by R. Lewontin (92-3), who says that we can-
not let any supernatural explanatory principle step in the door, since we 
have to be in principle materialists, C. claims that Lewontin went too far. 
For him, it ought to be possible to put God in the test tube. 
 Chapter 3 declares irrational the self-pleading or self-serving character 
of what is called “accommodationism”, which C. says is based on cognitive 
dissonance,  the  capacity  to  hold  two  or  more  irreconcilable  views  in  one’s  
mind. People live in a culture that reveres science, but they also cling to 
pre-scientific or pseudoscientific myths. To those who say that there is at 
least a mental compatibility because there are many scientists who are reli-
gious, who go to church or mosque or synagogue, and that there are reli-
gious people who practice science, C. replies that they cannot use historical 




arguments to make such a case, because in the early days of science it was 
no wonder that scientists were religious since everyone was religious. C. 
claims that the strategy for religious people is to redefine one of the two 
terms, “science”   or   “religion,”   so   that   it  will   include   the   other   (101). He 
shows his dismissal of the emotion-based mysticism stemming from the 
study of the cosmos by referring to Philip Gingerich (sic as he wrote Owen 
Gingerich), the paleontologist who witnessed to being connected to the 
large universe he is studying, and who expressed his Einstein-like awe-
struck sensation in front of it. Having dismissed any such solution, which 
one would also find in Ursula Goodenough, C. goes on to declare impossi-
ble the paradigm of their ultimate impossibility in principle of generating a 
contradiction, such as was advocated by Pope John Paul II, because it 
would according to him be silly, in the face of answers that are in fact irrec-
oncilable, to declare them compatible. 
 C. attacks the NOMA solution of Gould and says (107) that moral and 
philosophical issues have been handled by secular philosophers, thinkers 
and scientists without any need for religion, while he had said 10 pages ear-
lier that everyone was religious in the old days, such that it would not count 
if scientists also were religious (99): this goes to show the extent to which 
C. neglects the presence of roots of atheism in the history of Western 
thought – a history which was written way before this book was published 
(Lange’s  history  of  materialism  was being widely discussed at the end of 
the 19th century). Theism and atheism might have very little to do with the 
fact  that  we  now  “know”  so  much  more.  Gould  is  accused  of  restructuring  
science and religion so that they can coexist, and C. objects that religious 
people make claims that, one more time, fall out of NOMA, and land on the 
turf of science. He talks about Gould denying the reliance on miracles, and 
reviews his claim that creationism would not be religion (109). In fact, if 
natural theology has any value, the exceptional and miraculous cannot be 
ruled out by fiat. When he meets the objection of the undesirability of many 
of  science’s  outcomes,  C.  uses  the  exact  same  manoeuver, that of redefining 
science: it was not science which did it, but technology... What is more, he 
is claiming that scientists would never overstep their territory, while this is 
exactly what this book is overtly doing. 
 C. says that the theory of evolution is perfectly refutable. If one were to 
find a modern bird in sedimented rock, and were able to date it before the 
flying pterodactyls, one would have refuted the theory of evolution (31, 
104). We know however, from many other examples, that this is not what 
would happen. The theory would be sectorially revised and it would be 
praised for its integrative power, that can encounter such challenges and 
keep affirming the same beautiful and simple explanatory mechanism (see, 
e.g.,  J.  Monod,  “On  the  Molecular  Theory  of  Evolution”  in  R.  Harré  [Ed.],  
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Problems of Scientific Revolution, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975, pp. 19-
20).  So  the  way  one  would  save  the  “God-theory”,  and  the  way  one  saves  
the evolutionary theory, have something in common. This is borne out by 
the strangeness of the discussion of the genetical bases of altruism in chap-
ter 4, said to be a   result   of  our   including   strangers   in   our   “be  nice   to   ac-
quaintance”  module  (174),  and  this  while  at  the  same  moment  philosophers  
of technology such as S. Turkle or N. Carr write books documenting the 
exact opposite. C. is clinging to a paradigm of refutation that would take 
place with the adducing of a single counter-example, something which has 
been shown to be unrealistic, and to be an idealized armchair reconstruction 
of the history of science. 
 We read that science has lots to say about the supernatural, that it has 
tested it and found no evidence for it (113). C. runs with a statement by 
Carl Sagan from his Gifford lectures, The Varieties of Scientific Experience 
(2007), to the effect that he would see evidence of the Judaic-Christian re-
ligion if its sacred  documents  had  contained  a  sentence  like  “thou  shalt  not  
travel  faster  than  light.”  C.  claims  he  has  the  liberty  to  say  these  things,  be-
cause religious people, if asked what evidence would make them abandon 
their faith, will say that no data can dispel their belief in God. This is plain 
silly, as the debate between Whitehead and Einstein concerning the iso-
tropic  character  of  light’s  speed  in  a  vacuum  suggests:  one  need  not  look  at  
a dimensionless physical constant as an unchangeable viewpoint on reality; 
travel faster than the speed of light could be admitted one day, without the 
meaning of the Decalogue passing away. 
 Confronting miracles, and the Resurrection as the great miracle of the 
Christian faith, said to be unique and therefore to fall outside the realm of 
scientific scrutiny which looks for cosmic regularities, C. replies that histo-
rians can assess the likelihood that unique events have happened, and that 
the Resurrection does not meet any of these criteria. He also says that if we 
can’t   show   that humanoid evolution was inevitable, the reconciliation of 
evolution  and  Christianity  collapses  (141).  If  we  are  God’s  special  object  of  
creation, and he wants to have a covenant with us, evolution must have 
been  guaranteed  to  lead  to  us.  It’s  interesting to note how C. admits other-
wise that evolution does not guarantee to lead anywhere, which might sug-
gest that the door must be left open for another source of knowledge to in-
form us. He claims to dismiss any argument that there was an evolutionary 
convergence leading to man, as failures of convergence would call into 
question the inevitability and man’s uniqueness. They involve species that 
are missing. There are no bats, giraffes, etc., with equivalents among the 
marsupials in Australia, so that Australia has many unfilled niches. This in-
cludes the one which would have hosted humanoids, so for C., judging 
strictly and mechanically from the criterion of reproductive fitness, human 
beings did not appear everywhere out of some kind of cosmic necessity but 




only appeared in Africa. It is interesting to note how, in the face of objec-
tions to this line of thought by Simon Conway-Morris, he does the same 
name-calling as William Dembski, about whose Being as Communion 
(2015) the present reviewer has written in this journal (Vol. 25, No. 1). One 
only  needs  to  replace  bad  “naturalists”  by  irrational  “believers.”  For  C.,  our  
complex mentality is an evolutionary singleton, like the trunk on the ele-
phant or the feathers on the birds. He claims that human inevitability is de-
duced   from  one’s   religion,   but   in   so   doing   fails   to   acknowledge   the   long  
Lamarckian ascendency to this problem which always denied that efforts of 
the will were pointless in improving our estate. One has to remember that 
this was, in a modified fashion, the meta-story to which C’s   advisor   Le-
wontin clung, and is also the reason why most atheistic Soviet biologists 
were opposed to genetics and to the contingency of evolution, as well as the 
central role of chance. 
 The penultimate chapter strikes one with its defence of evolutionarily-
based altruism, which always aims at maximizing genetic fitness, and C. 
does not seem to appreciate how he self-contradicts in endowing the evolu-
tionary machinery with discrete mathematical abilities, while claiming that 
the altruist who self-sacrifices does not have to know how genetics works 
(174-5). (See S. Conway-Morris Life’s   Solution, Cambridge University 
Press, 2003, 314-5.) 
 This presentation of science rests on an implicit empiricist criterion of 
meaning that has been studied, scrutinized by an army of philosophers of 
science,  and   found  wanting.  C.’s  own  narrative   rests  on  a  myth,   that  of   a  
science entirely subservient to facts mindlessly recorded in material and be-
haviouristic systems. In fact, it seems that the same feeling is sought by re-
ligious people, and by a mature state of the sciences. The impediments to 
science’s   progress   have   not   come,   as   in   the   legend   around  Galileo, from 
backward-looking churchmen only, but had a lot to do with backdoor ma-
noeuvering among jealous fellow academics, as Stillman Drake’s lifetwork 
has shown. 
 What is more, C. constantly writes as though it was at all times possible 
to put one foot firmly into the  field  of  “science,”  and  from  there  see the irra-
tionality of everything else. This presupposes that we can tell good science 
from bad or pseudo-science. In fact, we cannot. The grand demarcation cri-
teria, be they those of Popper, of Lakatos, or more neo-positivistic-inspired 
ones, have all been found wanting and defective. In the present situation, as 
Larry Laudan has convincingly argued, we do not have an extrinsic crite-
rion  that  would  tell  us  if  we  are  doing  good  science  (see  “The  Demise  of  the  
Demarcation  Problem,”  But Is It Science?, M. Ruse [Ed.], New York, Pro-
metheus, 1988, 337-350). The best approach we can make is to come up 
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with  a  rating  of  “scientificness – finding independent criteria that are desir-
able – but they will all still be merely sufficient and not necessary condi-
tions for calling something science. Saying, as C. does, that we ought to 
give science the only credibility in knowledge worth having, and then say-
ing   that  one   still  undergoes  normal  human  emotion   just  won’t  do,   as   it   is  
simply irrelevant. It comes from a failure to have distinguished science as 
process from science as product. Repeating on and on that scientists who 
become better experts also lose faith, might mean that indeed the critical 
sense of inquiry leads them to some erosion of the simple trust in things, 
but then no one continues his/her life on these terms outside the lab. This 
amounts to an invitation to double-thinking. Here C. is found guilty of that 
which he has indicted all believers for doing. 
 Christianity makes definite truth-claims, and often they have been pro-
pelling science. I mean truth-claims   like   in   the  case  of  Boltzmann:  “there  
are  atoms”;;  it  is  by  pointing  to  a  substantial  order  of  this  kind,  while  theo-
ries will come and go, that science has made progress. Genes are such an 
intelligible network, that we trust to deliver something not entirely mapped 
out. Yet those claims of existence are not visible, they come from eliminat-
ing conflicting accounts of problematic behaviours. This   sort   of   “truth”  
amounts to progressively strengthening the framework on which science is 
built, and it yields a coherence theory of truth. 
 C. defines science to be something you can predict and find with success 
– which, incidentally, is just what cannot be achieved in evolutionary theo-
rizing. He adds in the preface that, should we sometimes fall short of this 
requirement, we will have to define science more broadly. As commented 
above how we rule in good science and rule out bad science can get tricky, 
since the heuristics of science require than any source of potential insight 
and inspiration be kept in. The wildest mystical dreams belong to the pic-
ture, as long as something testable can come from whatever proposal is 
generated in their wake; there is thus  no  real  “don’t  go  there”  that  one  can  
utter. It is simply preposterous to say that whatever religious statement one 
could consider, it could never have a heuristic positive effect. If C. claims 
that religions say contradictory things (which he would have to substantiate 
since, in virtue of his cherished principle due to Hitchens, these gratuitous 
affirmations could be denied every time since they are for the most part 
lacking in cases in point), then how can all religions be bundled together in 
such a lazy fashion, since given the fact that they contradict, one would ex-
pect at least some of them to state the same things as the worldview one 
gets  from  assembling  the  “truths”  of  science? 
 As Whitehead argued in 1926, religions can indeed become forces of 
darkness, when they cement a group of people together through enthusiastic 
and frenzied limit-experiences, and these give rise to rituality, except that 




there also is an inevitable movement within religious dynamics that will 
aim at rationalization, that will universalize the value of individual experi-
ence.  Religion  then  becomes  the  affair  of   the  individual  and  of  one’s  own  
destiny, situating one in the face of radical origin and ultimate destiny; in 
light  of   this,  C.’s  statistics   literally  mean  nothing  whatsoever,   they  are  be-
side the point. Religion is about questions that the human mind will ask it-
self, and to repress them as C. does has no justification. 
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